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LOGIC AND LAW
There is, no doubt, an intimate relation between logic and
law. This fact is apparent from expressions we frequently hear
after the trial of a well-contested case where the best legal talent
has been employed on both sides. We often hear expressions as
this: "The lawyer for the defense gave a very logical argument
to the jury." "The plaintiff's attorney introduced his evidence in
a logical manner." The purpose of this article is to show that
there is a relationship between Logic and Law, the influence of
the one upon the other, and that the aforementioned expressions
are not groundless. Before entering upon an article such as this,
it is necessary first to give a short outline of the scope and basis
of logic.
Logic may be defined as the science of the principles and con-
ditions of correct thinking; or, in other words, the science which
directs our mental operations in the discovery and proof of truth.
Logic is a science in the sense that it is organized knowledge
involving principles. The various sciences have different fields
for investigation, but all of them agree in their purpose, which is
the establishment of satisfactory information, bound together and
illuminated by laws. Thus, physics studies the most general char-
acteristics of the physical world and seeks to reduce to order and
interpret the facts it discovers; botany examines the structures,
functions and histories of plants, and psychology gives its atten-
tion to the behavior of creatures possessing consciousness. All
these sciences seek to replace the loose and hazy notions of popu-
lar thought by exact and systematic knowledge. Logic has the
same purpose, but its field is peculiar. It can not be classed
among the physical sciences which depend upon perception and
measurement, nor among the biological sciences, nor, finally,
among the social sciences. In a very real sense modern logic
presupposes all these sciences and is somehow a science removed
from things. It is a science about the mental aspect of the sci-
ences. The mediaval logicians pointed out that the mind first
"intends" or directs itself upon the external world, and that only
afterwards does it direct itself upon the mental processes and
methods it has used. We may say that logic involves a thinking
about thinking.
Because man is naturally outward-looking and desirous of prac-
tical results he is seldom clearly conscious of his methods and of
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the mental processes involved in thinking. It requires an effort
for him to take this new attitude and to think about thinking,
about these mental operations which make knowledge possible.
But when he does so, he finds that the mind does work in an
orderly fashion. It is the nature of this orderliness that logic
seeks to bring into clear consciousness.
Hence the utility and necessity of logic. It would be a mis-
take to imagine that, above and beyond what is called Natural
Logic of sound common sense, the study of the Science of Logic
is absolutely necessary for right reasoning. Men reasoned rightly
before Aristotle ever formulated a canon of logic. It was, in fact,
by an analysis of such reasonings that he discovered those canons;
they could never have been discovered otherwise. Here as else-
where the art came before the science; theory followed practice.
A man may reason rightly without knowing a single rule of the
syllogism; or conversely know all the details of logic and be an
indifferent guide to truth - just as a first-rate geometrician may
be a failure as an engineer. But still, just as his knowledge of
geometry will enable the geometrician to detect the defects of a
piece of engineering, so will an explicit knowledge of the canons
of reasoning enable us to discover more readily where the fallacy
of a misleading argument lies. Without professing to guard us
infallibly from error, logic familiarizes us with the rules and
canons to which right reasoning processes conform, and with the
hidden fallacies and pitfalls to which such processes are com-
monly exposed. Hence, one obvious benefit derivable from a
careful study of logic: a facility in detecting error in reasoning
processes and a consequent likelihood of avoiding such errors,
and of thinking and reasoning about difficult matters with clear-
ness and consistency-a capacity much rarer, even among edu-
cated people, than is commonly suspected.
But there is another - and perhaps greater- utility in the
study of logic: the advantage of the admirable mental discipline
which the study of the science indirectly and unconsciously in-
volves. It is by this mental training rather than by the explicit,
positive knowledge of its technical rules, that logic gives us the
power and habit of thinking clearly. Probably more than any
other science, a careful study trains and develops the reasoning
powers, not merely the power of thinking consistently, but the
power of discovering the truth.
LOGIC AND LAW
An eminent jurist of the Supreme Court of California, in his
article on the influence of Logic on Law said, "The logic referred
to is the Aristotelian logic and not the logic that is taught in
our universities." In Aristotle's logic, Demonstration as the
clearly perfect means of reaching Science, is his supreme concern.
His view of logic is, therefore, not the narrower but the wider
view. He paid more attention, however, to the application of
the syllogisms to necessary matter of metaphysics and mathe-
matics than to contingent matter of physical and concrete social
life. His theory, therefore, has developed in the aftertime,
especially by the scholastic philosophers of the middle ages,
tended towards a predominantly deductive and formal treatment
of our thought processes.
It must be owned that the subject of Induction received far
less attention than it deserved, but it is a mistake to assert, as so
many English textbooks on logic do, that Aristotle and the school-
men knew nought of inductive process save mere enumeration
which they called "Perfect and Imperfect Induction." This error
seems to have arisen from the fact that the most famous scholas-
tics, Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great), St. Thomas, Scotus
and Roger Bacon, following the terminology of Aristotle, term
our scientific induction the argument from Experience. Induc-
tion for them had a wider meaning. It remained for the later
generation to restrct this term to its present signification, when
the physical sciences almost forced the logicians to treat this
topic more fully and thus brought about the chief, if not the only
advancement of the science of logic to the modem times. Al-
though the logic of induction has its place in all investigation of
fact and evidence, yet its principal application in Law concern
the judge and the professor of law rather than the lawyer and
hence does not concern us here.
The influence of logic upon law arises from one fundamental
fact, that laws are not self-applicable - and a rule of law isolated
from a world of fact is no more than a speculative ghost. Prin-
ciples "live, move and have their being" as indicators of con-
trolling facts.
Law, accurately speaking, is organized principle, and from a
political point of view, is the chart by which human action, in
terms of fact is regulated. Manifestly, the inertia of such a non-
automatic machine calls for a force to give it vitality and action
as well as a supplementary art of manipulation. Such energy
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must be supplied by human life. Briefly, then, the function of
logical reasoning and the connection with the law is to secure
the efficient application of legal principles. Dr. Johnson's defini-
tion of lawyers, as reported by Boswell, contains much of the
meat of the matter. "Lawyers," he says, "are a class of the
community who by study and experience have acquired the art
and power of arranging evidence, and applying to the points at
issue what the law has settled." From what follows we will see
how accurate Dr. Johnson's definition is, and the art and power
of arranging evidence, and of applying to the points at issue what
the law has settled, is the ability to do this in a logical manner.
In other words, it is the efficient application of legal principles.
It is sometimes said that law is applied logic. Obviously this
epigrammatic statement has a foundation of truth, for the prac-
tice of law is fundamentally argumentative. It deals with sub-
jects in controversy, and its primary aim is the settlement of dis-
putes - sometimes by persuasive methods out of court and some-
times in fiercely contested legal battles - in either instance the
instrument of reasoning playing a dominant part. And first of
all, the initial sine qua non to the process of correct reasoning
and argumentation is the proposal of a proposition. Argumen-
tation is a process to determine the truth or falsity of some rela-
tion. To do this successfully requires that the particular relation
be set out carefully for that purpose -it must be clear, single
and alone. The only known method of securing such a result is
to embody the relation in that formula of thought and language,
that is to affirm a given thing to belong to a given subject. This
is known as a proposition, or the outline of a mental operation.
The Proposition is peculiarly essential to law, since the very
earliest attempts at judicial procedure in England recognized the
necessity of reducing a dispute to an issue which was defined to
be a Proposition affirmed on one side and denied on the other.
Now, the results sought by the process of argumentation are
either to prove the truth or falsity of a given proposition, or with
less absoluteness to induce the mind to believe at least in its
truth or falsity, or still less, merely to accept the same on general
principles. The first degree of impression constitutes the effect
of absolute certainty, the second moral certainty, while the third
amounts to some degree of probability only.
The forms of argument are, therefore, methods of adducing
evidence, and are valuable not only in- giving system and order
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to the compilation process, but also because they become a means
of discovering and disclosure of evidence otherwise overlooked.
One of the most important forms is argument by deduction.
Deductive logic is a mental operation the lawyer must employ
many times a day. Deduction is a movement of the mind from
an object as a whole to some point therein; a movement from the
general to the particulai-; an inference from the all to anyone in-
cluded within the all. We are familiar with the axiom or law of
thought, that two things that are equal to the same thing are
equal to each other.
For example, if we know the relation of A to X, and B to X,
we can discover the relation of A to B. Here, then, are the pre-
liminary relations - A to X and B to X - and thereupon the
conclusion follows of the relation of A to B. Obviously, there-
fore, in making this inference we will have three things to be
related, three relations resulting, and three propositions. The
total arrangement of these things, relations and propositions, in
order to show how the inference is thereby developed, is called a
syllogism. The language structure, whether it be composed of a
single word, or words, a phrase, clause, or a whole paragraph,
in short, whatever taken together is necessary to express the com-
plete idea of the thing related, when used in a syllogism, is called
a "term". The first proposition, because it contains the larger
term, is named the Major Premise, or literally the larger prin-
ciple laid down; the second, because it contains a smaller term, is
named the Minor Premise, or the lesser statement laid down;
while the third proposition, because it follows from the Major
and the Minor Premise, is named the Conclusion. The following
typical syllogism will illustrate this simple idea:
All men are mortal;
Socrates is a man;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The three terms are Socrates, mortal and man. It is evident
that Socrates and mortal, the two terms brought in the conclu-
sion, are established in their relation by means of a third term
to which both are related. This is the mechanism of the syl-
logism -a process which plays a large role in every argument
before the court and jury, but which still fills a more conspicuous
function in its relation to the system of pleadings.
Bliss, in his authoritative work on Code Pleading, gives sev-
eral pages to a discussion of the importance of the syllogism in
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the relation to pleading, in which he says, "Every statement of fact
constituting a cause of action or a defense, is but part of a logical
formula."
To illustrate how true the above statement is, the following
will show how in succession the issues raised in legal controversies
necessarily arrange themselves into the frame work of a deductive
syllogism:
Thus, suppose, in an action for trespass upon real property,
the plaintiff complains. Having looked up the general law gov-
erning trespass, we find the statute or common law to be in sub-
stance as follows:
COMPLAINT.
i. Major Premise: Anyone, who forcibly and against the
owner's will enters upon the lands of another is guilty of tres-
pass and is liable in damages.
Concluding that this general rule covers his case, he there-
fore makes out his pleading as follows:
2. Minor Premise and Complaint: The defendant did upon
a certain day and at a certain place, forcibly and against the will
of the owner, enter upon the plaintiff's land, etc.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, the plaintiff was injured and
damaged in the sum of X dollars (another way of saying that
the defendant committed a trespass to the damage of the plain-
tiff).
Now, in the above statements, there is exposed a complete
syllogism of which the first proposition constitutes the Major
Premise or the general rule of law; the second proposition con-
stitutes the Minor Premise by alleging certain facts to come
within the rule; the third proposition draws the conclusion which
the judgment of the court may afterwards affirm or deny. The
plaintiff's complaint thus expresses the Major Premise by impli-
cation and the Minor Premise by direct allegation and the con-
clusion by an indirect allegation of damages and a prayer for
judgment. Suppose that the defendant, upon inspection of the
above complaint, comes to the conclusion that the facts as alleged
do not come under the general rule of law, he thereupon raises
an issue of law, by demurring on the ground that the complaint




i. Major Premise: Any set of facts which does not come
within the general rule of law governing such facts is not ac-
tionable.
2. Minor Premise and Answer: This set of facts does not
come within the rule of law.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, this set of facts is not action-
able. Or, suppose again, that the defendant finds that the alleged
facts do com6 within the general rule of law, but that the so
alleged facts are not true as alleged and consequently he decides
to deny their truthfulness and thus raises an issue of fact. The
reasoning will run as follows:
i. Major Premise: Alleged facts which are not true con-
stitute no cause of action.
2. Minor Premise: The defendant denies each and every
allegation in the plaintiff's complaint. Equivalent to- the facts
are not true.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, there is no cause of action.
An action at law, as a whole, does not then merely consti-
tute an analogy to a syllogism, but is one, and is subject to all its
rules and fallacies. Deductive logic is the science of reasoning
from a general rule to a particular instance and the practice of
law is precisely that- the application of a general rule of law
to a particular set of facts.
Correct pleading is, therefore, but little more than correct
reasoning, and since it is compelled by the nature of the mind to
follow certain immutable logical principles, a comprehensive
knowledge of such principles is indispensable.
We have doubtless said enough to show the necessity of a
knowledge of logic for the lawyer in his work where he must
resort to argumentation. As regards the other topics treated in
logic, their utility is no less clear.
The Concept - the need of clear, precise ideas and exact
terms - must be evident to any reflecting mind.
Variations of language call for a knowledge of the various
forms of the syllogism.
Though the day of the professed Sophist is past, yet even
among lawyers there will not be wanting men, who for a con-
sideration will endeavor to make the "Weaker cause appear the
209
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
better." Hence the advantage of the study of common fallacies
-the hidden violation of logical rules or principles, which
might deceive the unwary. The old fallacious Dilemma, "Liti-
giosus," may find its counterpart today. It is related that Pro-
tagoras, the Sophist, agreed to train one Euathlus in the art of
rhetoric, the condition being that only half the fee should be paid
at the time, the payment of the remainder was to depend on
Euathlus's success in his first lawsuit. Should he fail, the fee
was to be forfeited. Euathlus delayed in undertaking any suit,
and eventually Protagoras himself summoned him before the
court. He urged the following dilemma against him:
If this case is decided in my favor, you must pay me
by order of the court; if it is decided in your favor, you
must pay me under the terms of our agreement.
But it must be decided either in my favor or in your
favor. Therefore, you are in any case bound to-pay me.
This argument was met by Euathlus as follows:
If the case is decided in your favor, I am free by the
terms of the agreement; if it is decided in my favor, I
am free by order of the court.
But it must be either decided in your favor, or in my
favor. Therefore, I am in any case discharged of my
debt.
The old judges of Greece, we are told, left the case unde-
cided; but to one who has studied logic to advantage, the fallacy
of the arguments of both contestants is self-evident.
NICHOLAS F. LUCAS, '19.
